THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

Background of the Study

The Philippine state has embarked on a journey towards peace and security throughout its long history. In the beginning, the nation’s struggle was directed against foreign forces that occupied the archipelago. From the Spanish, to the Americans, then later the Japanese occupation forces, Filipino freedom fighters had fought valiantly to regain the nation’s freedom and independence. At first, Filipino revolutionaries were tagged as insurgents by these occupation forces. Hence, military policies and strategies were drafted and implemented by these occupation forces to subdue the domestic conflict that brought internal chaos and dissent. In turn, early revolutionary leaders also crafted their own policies and strategies to legitimize their struggle and attempted to generate support from the nation’s elite and mass base alike (Milan and Catalan, 1972).

Later, in the advent of Philippine independence following the Second World War, the nation was once again marred by insurgencies, not against foreign forces, but against its own this time. The newly established republic was beset by new forms of opposition posed by factions of the society whose beliefs were founded on political ideologies and even religious extremism that countered the existing societal norms and value systems. For these grim realities that marked the Cold War era and beyond, the government had formulated counterinsurgency policies and strategies to supplant the brewing internal conflict that had brought the nation’s peace and development pursuits to a standstill (Milan and Catalan, 1972).

This paper intends to detail the evolution of the military’s counterinsurgency policies and strategies starting from the historic events that gave rise to insurgency due to western hegemony and the expansionist objectives of foreign powers, until the present dispensation wherein insurgency thrives despite the nation’s freedom and independence. There are two main shifts that are noted in reflecting the evolving counterinsurgency response. The first phase is recorded with the advent of Spanish, American and even Japanese hegemonic powers that had significantly influenced the conditions in the Philippine setting and eventually paved the way for the birth of local revolutionary forces against foreign domination. The second shift is observed with the emergence of post-World War II insurgent forces that had fought against the Filipino-led government ever since. These two phases that happened in an era of political-legal, informational-ideological, economic and socio-cultural transitions serve as the over-all context of this research.

After detailing such environmental context, this paper then relays the institutional content of military policies and strategies that were implemented starting from the Spanish to Japanese occupation time, then later, the counterinsurgency policies and strategies that were implemented after World War II up to the present. This institutional content later explains the military approach to address modern day insurgency that has spanned generations.

Likewise, these operational approaches are anchored on notable variables that are embedded in the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ system.

After all the external environmental conditions and the internal military policies and strategies are presented, impacts are then covered so as to gauge the relevance of such counterinsurgency policies and strategies to the rise and fall of insurgents’ strengths, firearms and barangay affectation. In so doing, certain disconnects are identified between the insurgent forces’ reasons for existence and the counterinsurgents’ response to thwart the same. The disparity now leads to the quest for viable solutions so future policy responses and strategic orientations are formulated in a more responsive fashion.

Conditions as Influenced by Western Hegemony

The advancement of globalization in the 19th century had fuelled discontent among Filipino patriots and early revolutionary forces emerged to oppose the oppressive Spanish conquistadores from the 1890’s to the 1900’s. The peoples’ discontent had finally peaked after more than 377 years of colonization that ran on the twin engines of the galleon trade and the propagation of Roman Catholicism. The movement of the masses was not an isolated one since Filipino intelligentsia, including Dr. Jose Rizal, was likewise influenced by the rise of liberal ideas and the French revolution in Europe. These two social forces that combined ‘brawns and brains’ had ignited the revolt that anchored its tenacity and strength on the blood of countless Filipino martyrs, like the three priests; Gomez, Burgoz and Zamora. The early Filipino revolutionaries’ existence paved the way for the birth of the Filipino nation in 1898, which also marked the institution of the revolutionary army from its humble beginning (Guerrero, 1971).

But the euphoria of the birth of a new state was short lived. From the 1900’s to the 1940’s, American forces took over the reign of domination after a mock battle in Manila Bay and the secession of the young Philippine nation for the amount of US$ 20,000,000.00 thereafter. The new occupation forces formed the republic and implemented a democratic civil service that was based on Anglo-Saxon laws and on modern philosophies of education championed by the Thomasites (Guerrero, 1971).

The almost half a century of uneasy peace with the American government was tested when World War II spread in the Pacific. Japanese forces barged their way into the islands to impose ‘Asia for Asians’ under their imperialistic campaign of ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.’ Events that had unfolded from the 1940’s to the 1950’s forged a stronger alliance between Filipino and American troops to fight a common foe during the war. For a time, Filipino guerrillas fought alongside American forces against the Japanese Imperial Army until the liberation of the archipelago by Allied forces (Pobre, 2000).

War reparations and the country’s rehabilitation followed after the massive destruction that ranked second only to Warsaw in Poland. However,such transition back to self-determination with American benevolent s upport left a substantial faction of the Hukbalahap fighting for full-pledged independence from foreign control (Pobre, 2000).

Boiling Points for Post World War II Insurgencies

Conditions after the Second World War in the forties up to the sixties were ripe for the rise of the Huks (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon) that first formed part of the guerrilla forces that fought the Japanese and later became the military arm of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. They fought against pro-Western leaders of the newly independent Philippines from 1946 to 1954 (Valereano, 2006).

After the Huk rebellion, the social and political turmoil during the sixties was considered as an effect of the regional troubles that saw the encroachment of communism in Southeast Asia. As war raged in Korea and Vietnam and other neighboring countries, the Communist Party of the Philippines and its arm, the New Peoples’ Army, came to existence. This paved the way for a new variant of communist movement that was directly hued with the establishment of dictatorships in the region, as well (Valereano, 2006).

The communist conflict and widespread social unrest led to the declaration of martial law in the seventies. The resulting suspension of civil rights in the local scene and the brewing oil crisis and conflicts in the Middle East also brought Muslim activism to the fore that eventually led to the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and later, its breakaway faction the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). These Muslim secessionist movements had further thrown their weight to bear upon a nation that was already heavily burdened by communists’ intrusion (Majul, 1973).

The increased Muslim secessionism and Islamic extremism in the country ran parallel with the brewing terrorism in other parts of the globe, the tearing down of the Berlin wall, and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the eighties. The shifting definition of national security that refocused its sights against terrorist groups from the previous anti-communist stand saw the emergence of the Abu Sayyaf Group in southern Philippines. These veterans of the Afghanistan war had conducted atrocious acts, purportedly against Western expansionism and American intervention in Middle Eastern countries’ affairs (Abuza, 2003).

The peace negotiations resulted in the signing of a peace accord with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the early nineties. MNLF leaders had laid down their arms and participated in the parliamentary process while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued with their aim for a separate Bangsa Moro state through armed struggle. However, as global events had unfolded like the Iraq wars, the emergence of another Muslim militant group was also observed. The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) came to prominence at the same time that the global war on terror was raging (Abuza, 2003).

Disconnects in Insurgents’ Actions and Counterinsurgents’ Reactions

All these transformations in the environmental context had caused the birth and growth of insurgent forces through time. Although the government had implemented various counterinsurgency policies and strategies, these military interventions were insufficient to comprehensively solve the resurgence of insurgency.

Significant effects of all pre-war military policies and strategies reflect the glaring disconnects between the utilization of the government’s power and resources and the suppression of insurgent groups’ principles, objectives and means. The various policy shifts and strategic reorientations mirrored such ineffectiveness in responding to the evolving nature and definitions of communist insurgency.

Although the Spanish policy and strategy that launched sustained military operations had greatly weakened the Filipino freedom fighters’ will, the firm resolve of Filipino revolutionaries, who were considered insurgents, was evident with the consequent end of the Spanish era, sans the aid of American forces (Guerrero, 1971).

Early American policy and strategy had disintegrated Filipino revolutionary counteractions and quashed the sustained struggle for freedom and independence following the United States’ take-over from Spain. Later,

policies and strategies during the Commonwealth period were found to be unresponsive in setting the impregnable defense of the Philippine territory thus exposing the archipelago’s vulnerability against foreign invasion. This, however, cemented the alliance between American forces and Filipino fighters to quell the Japanese Imperial Forces’ advance into Southeast Asia. Such collaboration had likewise orchestrated the underground movement and resistance during the Japanese occupation (Mills, 1997).

The Japanese imperialism had unified American and Filipino forces. Policies and strategies during World War II were anchored on the United States’ Armed Forces general orders. The defensive strategy for the archipelago was also set in place while the Philippine-Japanese Pact of Alliance was launched on the side. The nation was divided in this great time of distress (Mills, 1997).

After World War II, Japanese collaborators were identified and dealt with accordingly. The period also witnessed the reparation of damaged systems and facilities and the resuscitation of the Philippine bureaucracy and economy from the rubbles of the Japanese onslaught (Pobre, 2000).

Yet, new security challenges emerged after the war in the mid-forties and mid-fifties. Communist insurgency evolved in the post-war era and consequent counterinsurgency policy proved to be unsuccessful as guerrilla operations by the Huks continued. Despite the rejuvenation of democracy in the country, protracted counterinsurgency campaign ensued against the Huks. This transpired even if the AFP had intensified its training programs and skills development in a period of where American support abounded. There was only relative success in the military’s counterinsurgency mission (De Guzman, 1975; Ardo, 2001).

Nevertheless, successful post-war counterinsurgency policy and strategy finally occurred in the late fifties. This resulted in the mass surrender of dissidents including the Huks’ key leaders. Communist insurgency was finally put down through a series of reforms and military victories (De Guzman, 1975). This success was followed by the reduction of strength of the army with the emplacement of constabulary units that were created to maintain peace and order within their respective jurisdictions. With peace in place, economic reform and development initiatives were advanced well into the early sixties (Hamilton, 1998).

However, events in the Cold War period took a turn for the worst when communist advance threatened Southeast Asia from the mid-sixties onward. This period saw the resurrection of communist insurgency and the Muslim secessionist movement into the early seventies.

Sadly, counterinsurgency policies and strategies were more focused on confronting the communist threat in northern Philippines than paying equal attention to the Muslim insurrection in the south. So while communist insurgency raged in the north, the Muslim problem exploded out of proportion

in the south. These backdrops induced the declaration of martial law and the widespread military offensives that followed afterwards.

Counterinsurgency policies and strategies changed drastically in the succeeding decades. After the strong military stance, conditions in the eighties and the nineties called for re-democratization and the primacy of civil-military collaboration. The civilian leadership followed the path to peace and seriously applied amnesty and reintegration of rebels to the society. Yet, these policy readjustments and strategy reconfigurations would sometimes revert back to tighter military measures when violations of the peace process were observed, as in the event that led to the Mindanao Wars in 2000. These incremental changes moved on to include wider coverage in governance and inclusion of insurgent leadership in mainstream political processes.

Despite these innovations in counterinsurgency responses, the government still groped for more potent solution to shun armed insurgency for good. Still, while these actions were given enough impetus to proceed, the armed threats transformed into another variant that defies legal definition. However, present counterinsurgency measures are still anchored on the national defense policy that dates back to the Commonwealth era. The National Defense Act of 1935 remains as the overarching security policy of recent times after the repeal of the Republic Act 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law.

For now, attempts to impose the Human Security Act of 2002, also known as the Anti-Terrorism Law, proved to be problematic and challenging. The policy is perceived to have afforded more restraints and limitations to law enforcers and the counterinsurgent forces than the target terrorists themselves. While all these policies and strategies are reconstituted, the armed threats continue to hound the Filipino polity.

Indeed, for the current peace and security initiative, a new set of methodologies and parameters for performance are needed, and this paper hopes to contribute to the effort to seek for new ways to end insurgency (IPSP, 2011).

The constant variation in counterinsurgency policy formulation and implementation from 1896 to 2011 had clearly shown the deviations in the application of internal counterinsurgency strategies against established principles, objectives and means of various armed insurgent groups. Policy discontinuation was also noted across history, which was inherent in the country’s political and social transitions. The different strategic orientations were reactionary solutions to the constantly changing political-legal, informational-ideological, economic and socio-cultural environments. It then seemed that dedication and commitment from counterinsurgent forces were only half-hearted to fully respond to the insurgents’ ideological focus and political determination. 

All these had laid down extreme consequences to the nation’s social peace and political stability as the insurgency problem continued. While the external environment had influenced counterinsurgency policy implementation, the effectiveness of military strategy in coping with the insurgency threat was severely affected by internal military conditions.

Inevitable Influences of External Environmental Factors

These significant observations on the disconnect between insurgents’ actions and counterinsurgents’ reactions had pointed to the focal assumption of this study that various insurgent groups’ principles, objectives and means are influenced by the much wider political-legal, informational-ideological, economic and socio-cultural environments. The Armed Forces of the Philippines’ internal counterinsurgency policies and strategies are systematic reactions that are also dependent on the shifts and adjustments shaped by the external environment. Hence, the military’s counterinsurgency operations are but small components of the whole solution to fully suppress the increment in insurgents’ statistics. Due consideration of all external environment factors and internal military variables in the counterinsurgency equation is the most feasible approach, if indeed, a novel counterinsurgency policy and strategy will be formulated to respond to the challenges of the 21st century.

This time around, the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ counterinsurgency policy and strategy are moving towards the involvement of the ‘whole-of-nation’ with the implementation of the AFP Internal peace and Security Plan ‘Bayanihan.’ The new plan now comprises all the external and internal stakeholders in the pursuit of peace and development. This is a timely proposition as the new counterinsurgency policy and strategy requires a paradigm shift in the way the AFP operates against various threat groups (IPSP, 2011).

Statement of the Problem

The current counterinsurgency response is still in its initial stage. As the nation emerges from the challenges of the past, it is now the opportune time to face the future with confidence gained from experience. Truly, peace and security must be emphasized in order to realize the developmental goals of the Philippine nation.

This paper then realizes the need to evaluate the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ counterinsurgency policies and strategies, starting from the time of the inception of the revolutionary force in 1896 up to the present dispensation. This is done with the end-in-view of advocating serious rethinking of counterinsurgency policy direction, strategic orientation and in the AFP’s systems in order to reduce, if not totally negate, insurgents’ strengths, weapons acquisition and guerrilla front expansion.

Furthermore, this research will answer the following specific questions:

1. What are the essential external environmental factors and internal military variables of the various counterinsurgency policies and strategies that were implemented throughout the nation’s history?

2. What are the significant impacts of the external policy environment’s political-legal, informational-ideological, economic and socio-cultural factors to the evolution of numerous insurgent groups in the country?

3. How responsive are the internal strategic military variables to address the insurgency problem, particularly in reducing insurgents’ strengths, firearms in their possession and barangay affectation across all administrations in Philippine governance?

4. What important lessons can be gained from historical cases that promote more successful counterinsurgency approach to address the insurgency dilemma?

5. How can these valuable lessons learned be used for future counterinsurgency scenarios such that the government’s policy making and military’s decision-making process at the strategic and operational levels will be further improved?

6. What alternative counterinsurgency model can be advocated to replace the age-old ‘triad’ model to counter insurgency?

Definition of Terms

1. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) - is the principal body of defense of the Republic of the Philippines, led by the Commander-in-Chief, in the person of the President of the Philippines. It is presently composed of the Philippine Army (Hukbong Katihan), the Philippine Navy (Hukbong Dagat), and the Philippine Air Force (Hukbong Himpapawid) (1987 Philippine Constitution).

In this research, however, the term AFP is used interchangeably to refer to both the transforming Filipino revolutionary forces that fought against foreign occupation forces (Spanish, American and Japanese), and the formally organized military that fought against insurgent, secessionist and terrorist forces (HUKBALAHAP, CNN, MNLF, MILF, ASG, JI) after World War II. The historical changes of the AFP as an organization are taken into account from its revolutionary foundation to its present tri-service formation (Philippine Constitution, 1987).

2. Insurgency - is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) where those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. It can be fought via counterinsurgency warfare, and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population, and by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime (AFP ISO Plan, 1988; Pobre, 2000).

In the early parts of this study, the term insurgency was used to label Filipino freedom fighters who opposed the foreign occupation forces. In later portions of this research, however, the term is already collectively used to mean the various communist, secessionist and terrorist groups like the CNN, MNLF, MILF, ASG, JI. Although various shifts in definition and government policy reactions already segregated secessionist and terrorist movements from the main insurgency label. Hence, even policies and strategies against these groups are distinct from those implemented against communist insurgent forces.

3. Counterinsurgency (COIN) - involves actions taken by the recognized government of a nation to contain or quell an insurgency taken up against it. In real sense, the insurgents seek to destroy or erase the political authority of the defending authorities in a population they seek to control, and the counterinsurgent forces seek to protect that authority and reduce or eliminate the supplanting authority of the insurgents (NISP, 2001).

Counterinsurgency operations are common during occupation and armed rebellions. Concrete examples of the differing utilization of this term transpired when counterinsurgency operations were conducted by the Spanish, American and Japanese occupation forces against Filipino revolutionary and guerrilla forces. After World War II, the term was used to refer to counterinsurgency operations that were conducted by the established Philippine state against armed rebellions such as the HUKS, CNN, MNLF,

MILF, ASG, JI. Later, government reactions against the ASG and JI were tagged as counter-terrorism operations.

Counterinsurgency may be armed suppression of a rebellion, coupled with tactics such as ‘divide and rule’ designed to fracture the links between the insurgency and the population in which the insurgents move. Because it may be difficult or impossible to distinguish between an insurgent, a supporter of an insurgency who is a non-combatant, and entirely uninvolved members of the population, counterinsurgency operations have often rested on a confused, relativistic, or otherwise situational distinction between insurgents and non-combatants (Quilop, 2007).

4. Policy - a government action which is generally the principled guide to action taken by the administrative or executive branches of the state with regard to a class of issues in a manner consistent with law and institutional customs. In general, the foundation is the pertinent national constitutional law and implementing legislation. Further substrates include both judicial interpretations and regulations which are generally authorized by legislation. Other scholars define it as a system of ‘courses of action, regulatory measures, laws, and funding priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a governmental entity or its representatives.’ Public policy is commonly embodied ‘in constitutions, legislative acts, and judicial decisions’ (Mendoza, 1998).

In this paper, the term policy refers to the whole context of the counterinsurgency campaign wherein the government’s policy reaction is taken into account. It is the consideration of the entire civil authority’s response to quell the external root causes of the problem like politico-legal, informational-ideological, economic and socio-cultural maladies.

5. Strategy - refers to a plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal. In military usage, strategy is distinct from tactics, which is concerned with the conduct of an engagement, while strategy is concerned with how different engagements are linked. How a battle is fought is a matter of tactics: the terms and conditions that it is fought on and whether it should be fought at all is a matter of strategy, which is part of the four levels of warfare: political goals or grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. Building on the work of many thinkers on the subject, one can define strategy as ‘a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills – there have to be at least two sides to a conflict. These sides interact, and thus a strategy will rarely be successful if it shows no adaptability.’ Strategy has been extended beyond its traditional fields of military and grand strategy, to business, economics, game theory and other fields (DND, 2004; NSC, 2011).

The term strategy is used in this paper as the internal reaction by the military force to quell armed insurgency. It is also distinct and apart from the policy definition that comprises the entire government response. The internal capacity and capability of the AFP are the ones being considered (GHQ, AFP, 2011).

Further, the dynamics in combining policy and strategy for this study translates into the counterinsurgency direction and means to provide in order to accomplish the same. The same definition can be derived from Clausewitz’s Trinity of War wherein the government sets the policy and the military sets the strategy to fight and achieve the policy. Popular support then sustains the government policy and the military in its fight. This is a basic derivation that sets civilian control of the military and politics as a driving force of war (Clausewitz, 1976; NSC, 2011).

The same holds true with the National Security Council’s (2011) definition that places National Security Policy as the ‘ends’ of the National Security Plan and the National Security Strategy as a compendium of national security related programs, plans and sub-strategies, which are the ‘ways and means’ of the National Security Plan.

6. Peace - a state of harmony characterized by the lack of violent conflict. Commonly understood as the absence of hostility, peace also suggests the existence of healthy or newly healed interpersonal or international relationships, prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a working political order that serves the true interests of all. In international relations, peacetime is not only the absence of war or conflict, but also the presence of cultural and economic understanding and unity. There is also a sense of tolerance in international relations for the realization of true peace (IPSP, 2011; NSC, 2011).

Peace, as an end state of the current AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan would mean the successful pursuit and completion of the peace process with various insurgent entities. Reaching final peace accord with these groups (CNN, MILF) coupled with the effective neutralization of other smaller factions (ASG, JI) will eventually redound to this ultimate end to armed confrontations (IPSP, 2011).

7. Security - the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. Initially focusing on military might, it now encompasses a broad range of facets, all of which impinge on the military or economic security of the nation and the values espoused by the national society. Accordingly, in order to possess national security, a nation needs to possess economic security, energy security, environmental security, etc. Security threats involve not only conventional foes such as other nation-states but also non-state actors such as violent non-state actors, narcotic cartels, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations. Some authorities include natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this category (IPSP, 2011; NSC, 2011).

For this paper, security is equated to the responsive subjugation of internal security threats like armed insurgency and terrorism. The consequent elimination of the insurgency problem in society is the first priority for the establishment of national security.

This falls under the overarching framework of the National Security Policy that calls for securing the gains of democracy, promoting peoples’ welfare and the prosperity of the Filipino nation (NSC, 2011).

8. 21st Century - the current century of the Anno Domini era or the Common Era in accordance with the Gregorian calendar. This century began on January 1, 2001 and will end on December 31, 2100. The years from 2001 to 2011 are historical; the years from 2012 to 2100 are subject to futurology and projections. Currently, eleven years of the 21st century have transpired (Buszynski, 1994; Webster Dictionary, 2011).

This research aims to project and prescribe normative and pragmatic counterinsurgency policy and strategy for the current administration and even beyond.

Significance of the Study

This study highlights the historical foundations and theoretical frameworks of the AFP’s counterinsurgency policies and strategies from the start of the nation’s military history to the present dispensation. This paper also analyses different policy contexts and strategic contents through time using various success and failure factors that are based from policy studies and other academic references. The comparative analysis is anchored on the over-all impact of all policies and strategies to the country’s insurgency

situation. This is an important policy research that considers past experiences and present application to move on to future innovation.

This paper moves for the formulation of new policy perspectives for the continuing campaign of the current administration based on the balanced accounting of historical events, concurrence to conceptual frameworks of policy analysis, elucidation of various theories and infusion of actual experiences in counterinsurgency policy formulation and implementation. Policy recommendations advanced by this research emanate from an intellectual discourse and presentation of innovative approaches that are aimed for the improvement of the counterinsurgency campaign. This is valuable to policy makers, decision makers, analysts, scholars, students, journalists and many more, who may find counterinsurgency study as a worthwhile academic endeavor.

This paper also offers an alternative policy model that flies through the face of the existing counterinsurgency model that was culled from the Cold War theoretical and doctrinal genesis. All previous historical and theoretical accounts that had led to the continuous changes in the nature, dynamics, characteristics and meanings of counterinsurgency approach definitely need rejuvenation. Policy alternatives offered by this research can give fresher outlook to solve the insurgency problem in time of the pressing call for peace and security. Future counterinsurgency policies and strategies must then encompass previous form and substance, and comprise all improvements identified by this research for a more responsive change.

The alternative counterinsurgency model can replace the ‘body-count’ syndrome or the statistical computations usually associated with a shooting war. Instead, this paper offers a more efficient statistical analysis tool that incorporates and measures different politico-legal, informational-ideological, economic, and socio-political pursuits. This approach establishes a more reliable correlation between the external environment factors (policy context) and internal military variables (strategic content) to the insurgency situation, specifically, the rise and fall of insurgents’ strengths, firearms and influenced barangays (Grindle, 2003).

This research is a valuable contribution to the insurgency and counterinsurgency literature as it incorporates dramatic shifts in sets of theories with the way measures of effectiveness are established. In order to properly measure performance, the simplistic ‘triad’ concept must be replaced with a more comprehensive method that covers all factors identifiable in the policy context and strategic content, which this paper hopes to offer.

Scope and Delimitation of the Study

The background is limited only to the enumeration of government policies and military strategies against insurgency from the time of the birth of the nation at the turn of the 19th century up to the end of World War II. Additional background information on the different counterinsurgency approaches are offered after the Second World War up to the mid-sixties during the Cold War era. These various historical and theoretical shifts in

policies and strategies served as the basis for the constantly evolving definition and characteristics of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the terms insurgency and counterinsurgency. Previous military policies and strategies recorded by Catalan and Milan from 1896 up to 1972 and the author’s doctoral dissertation regarding the AFP’s counterinsurgency program from 1969 up to 2009, are inextricably linked to paint the whole picture of the background of this paper. Definitions of various terms used in this research are based on doctrinal references and translated into indigenized form to suit the local insurgency and counterinsurgency situation.

This paper includes in detail the numerical evolution of the over-all insurgents’ strength, firearms and barangays affectation from 1969 up to 2009. Earlier events are sparingly backed up by statistical data that reflects the numerical progression or regression of insurgents from 1896 to 1969. These can be attributed to the fact that no clear accounting was institutionalized by the General Headquarters, AFP in those days. If ever recording was done, these were either destroyed through time or burned during the war in the forties and in the series of coup attempts that happened in the eighties. Proper accounting and safekeeping of records were only observed during the Marcos years up to the present administration, thereby explaining the availability of statistical records for these periods.

This study also analyzes primary data from the AFP and secondary data from published books, released journals and other available reference materials that delve on the subject matter of insurgency and

counterinsurgency. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, only declassified materials were accessed from the AFP archives. The libraries at the DND, GHQ and other major services are also lacking in references that deal comprehensively on the topic. Only bits and pieces of history and tidbits of information that are captured in specific time-frame or administration are included in this paper.